Accurate estimate of long-term risk is critical for safe decision-making, but sampling from rare risk events and long-term trajectories can be prohibitively costly. Risk gradient can be used in many first-order techniques for learning and control methods, but gradient estimate is difficult to obtain using Monte Carlo (MC) methods because the infinitesimal divisor may significantly amplify sampling noise. Motivated by this gap, we propose an efficient method to evaluate long-term risk probabilities and their gradients using short-term samples without sufficient risk events. We first derive that four types of long-term risk probability are solutions of certain partial differential equations (PDEs). Then, we propose a physics-informed learning technique that integrates data and physics information (aforementioned PDEs). The physics information helps propagate information beyond available data and obtain provable generalization beyond available data, which in turn enables long-term risk to be estimated using short-term samples of safe events. Finally, we demonstrate in simulation that the proposed technique has improved sample efficiency, generalizes well to unseen regions, and adapts to changing system parameters.

Accurate estimates of long-term risk probabilities and their gradients are critical for many stochastic safe control methods. However, computing such risk probabilities in real-time and in unseen or changing environments is challenging. Monte Carlo (MC) methods cannot accurately evaluate the probabilities and their gradients as an infinitesimal devisor can amplify the sampling noise. In this paper, we develop an efficient method to evaluate the probabilities of long-term risk and their gradients. The proposed method exploits the fact that long-term risk probability satisfies certain partial differential equations (PDEs), which characterize the neighboring relations between the probabilities, to integrate MC methods and physics-informed neural networks. We provide theoretical guarantees of the estimation error given certain choices of training configurations. Numerical results show the proposed method has better sample efficiency, generalizes well to unseen regions, and can adapt to systems with changing parameters. The proposed method can also accurately estimate the gradients of risk probabilities, which enables first- and second-order techniques on risk probabilities to be used for learning and control.

With the introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and related technologies in our daily lives, fear and anxiety about their misuse as well as the hidden biases in their creation have led to a demand for regulation to address such issues. Yet blindly regulating an innovation process that is not well understood, may stifle this process and reduce benefits that society may gain from the generated technology, even under the best intentions. In this paper, starting from a baseline model that captures the fundamental dynamics of a race for domain supremacy using AI technology, we demonstrate how socially unwanted outcomes may be produced when sanctioning is applied unconditionally to risk-taking, i.e. potentially unsafe, behaviours. As an alternative to resolve the detrimental effect of over-regulation, we propose a voluntary commitment approach wherein technologists have the freedom of choice between independently pursuing their course of actions or establishing binding agreements to act safely, with sanctioning of those that do not abide to what they pledged. Overall, this work reveals for the first time how voluntary commitments, with sanctions either by peers or an institution, leads to socially beneficial outcomes in all scenarios envisageable in a short-term race towards domain supremacy through AI technology. These results are directly relevant for the design of governance and regulatory policies that aim to ensure an ethical and responsible AI technology development process.

Rapid technological advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), as well as the growing deployment of intelligent technologies in new application domains, have generated serious anxiety and a fear of missing out among different stake-holders, fostering a racing narrative. Whether real or not, the belief in such a race for domain supremacy through AI, can make it real simply from its consequences, as put forward by the Thomas theorem. These consequences may be negative, as racing for technological supremacy creates a complex ecology of choices that could push stake-holders to underestimate or even ignore ethical and safety procedures. As a consequence, different actors are urging to consider both the normative and social impact of these technological advancements, contemplating the use of the precautionary principle in AI innovation and research. Yet, given the breadth and depth of AI and its advances, it is difficult to assess which technology needs regulation and when. As there is no easy access to data describing this alleged AI race, theoretical models are necessary to understand its potential dynamics, allowing for the identification of when procedures need to be put in place to favour outcomes beneficial for all. We show that, next to the risks of setbacks and being reprimanded for unsafe behaviour, the time-scale in which domain supremacy can be achieved plays a crucial role. When this can be achieved in a short term, those who completely ignore the safety precautions are bound to win the race but at a cost to society, apparently requiring regulatory actions. Our analysis reveals that imposing regulations for all risk and timing conditions may not have the anticipated effect as only for specific conditions a dilemma arises between what is individually preferred and globally beneficial. Similar observations can be made for the long-term development case. Yet different from the short-term situation, conditions can be identified that require the promotion of risk-taking as opposed to compliance with safety regulations in order to improve social welfare. These results remain robust both when two or several actors are involved in the race and when collective rather than individual setbacks are produced by risk-taking behaviour. When defining codes of conduct and regulatory policies for applications of AI, a clear understanding of the time-scale of the race is thus required, as this may induce important non-trivial effects. This article is part of the special track on AI and Society.  

Predicting potential credit default accounts in advance is challenging. Traditional statistical techniques typically cannot handle large amounts of data and the dynamic nature of fraud and humans. To tackle this problem, recent research has focused on artificial and computational intelligence based approaches. In this work, we present and validate a heuristic approach to mine potential default accounts in advance where a risk probability is precomputed from all previous data and the risk probability for recent transactions are computed as soon they happen. Beside our heuristic approach, we also apply a recently proposed machine learning approach that has not been applied previously on our targeted dataset [15]. As a result, we find that these applied approaches outperform existing state-of-the-art approaches.